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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a civil action for damages
alleged to have been proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, from which this appeal arises is based on UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended).
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (j)
(1953, as amended).
Judgment of the trial court was entered on the 5th
day of March, 1991, and Appellants' Notice of Appeal Wcis filed
with the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, on the 2nd day
of April, 1991.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting

demonstrative evidence which was irrelevant and misleading?

II.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing

defense counsel to solicit the injection of evidence that the
plaintiff had received workers' compensation benefits as a
result of the accident in question?
1

III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of conduct indicating an admission of liability
because

the

admission

was

inseparably

intertwined

with

evidence of the defendant's possession of liability insurance?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standard of review of evidentiary rulings by the trial
court turns upon abusive discretion by the trial court where
the admission or exclusion of evidence is based upon relevancy
verses probative value.
admissibility

However, where the question of

is one of law, the issue may by directly

reviewed by the appellate court and reversed where the judge
commits a clear error of law.

(See eg. Whitehead v. American

Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990);

State v.

Bart lev. 784 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Larsen. 775
P.2d 415 (Utah 1989))

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Subsequent to an accident involving the parties on
or about the 18th day of June, 1987, at approximately one mile
West of the junction of SR-189 and SR-92, in Utah County,
State of Utah, the plaintiff, Douglas E. Butts, brought a
claim against the defendant for personal injury and damages
2

which he suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged
negligence.
That trial was held on February 11, 1991 through
February 14, 1991. On or about August 21, 1987, the plaintiff
filed the above-referenced action against the defendant. The
plaintiff's complaint alleged that the resulting personal
injuries

and

damages

were

proximately

caused

by

the

defendant's negligent action of crossing over the center
dividing line forcing the plaintiff to swerve off the road to
avoid a collision with the defendant.
On or about February 13th, 1991, the court held a
hearing outside the presence of the jury, during which the
court entertained oral arguments as to the admissability of
certain video tapes depicting the road traveled by the parties
preceding, subsequent to, and at the accident site. The court
excluded certain segments of a video tape produced by Greg
Duval because they did not depict the circumstances as they
existed at the time of the accident, and admitted only those
portions of the video tape showing sections of the road prior
to the section of Cannon road involved in the accident.
admitted

sections

of

the

Duval

tape

were

admitted

The
as

illustrative of what the circumstances were and the type of
curve the parties experienced. (Ibid, at page 48, line 1-25)
3

During trial certain proceedings were held to decide
whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by permitted questioning
from defense counsel which led to the injection of evidence
that

the

plaintiff

had

received

workers'

compensation

benefits, and also whether the plaintiff should be allowed to
question the defendant as to actions which indicated an
admission

of

liability

when

such

actions

concern

defendant's possession of liability insurance.

the

The court

decided, in the former issue, that no mention of amount had
been made in regards to already recovered benefits, and it was
therefore not prejudicial. (See Abstracts From Transcript of
Trial: Comprising proceedings had outside the presence of the
jury, page 10, line 12-17) .

Counsel for plaintiff made a

formal objection to this decision.

(See Abstract From

Transcript of Trial: comprising proceedings held outside the
presence of the jury, page 9, line 17-22)
Furthermore, the court decided that if proposed
testimony concerning the defendant's switching of liability
insurance went to prove that the defendant, at the time, "knew
or suspected or felt that he had some liability and was
attempting to take and do something to shield him from that,"
that it was relevant and should be admitted.
6, line 14-22)

(Ibid, at page

However, the court, during proceedings on
4

the 13th day of February, 1991, decided that the prejudice
outweighed the possible probativeness of the evidence sought
to be admitted.
On March 5th, 1991 final judgment was rendered
indicating no negligence on either party.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On

or

about

the

18th

day

of

June,

1987, at

approximately one mile West of the junction of Sr-189 and SR92, in Utah County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gary Laney,
drove and operated a motor vehicle traveling downhill in a
southerly direction; (See Complaint, page 1, paragraph 1-3)
Simultaneously, the plaintiff was traveling uphill
northerly direction on a motorcycle.

in a

The plaintiff alleged

that the defendant crossed the center dividing line at a bend
in the road and in response the plaintiff swerved off the road
into some rock outcroppings suffering physical injury and
property damage.

(See Complaint, page 2, paragraph 4 and 5)

The plaintiff's injuries necesitated multiple spinal
surgeries.

He was left with severe neurological impairments

and a disability of whole person rating of forty-nine (49)
percent.

(See generally deposition of Dr. Gaufin)
5

The plaintiff brought a complaint for the resulting
physical injury and property damage based on the alleged
negligence of the defendant in crossing the center line and
forcing the plaintiff to avoid head-on collision.

(See

generally plaintiff's complaint)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Irrelevant and misleading evidence is inadmissible
and should be excluded.

The Duval reconstruction video

depicting the road preceding the section of road where the
accident occurred was both irrelevant and inadmissable and
should have been excluded as a matter of law.
The above-mentioned video tape was irrelevant in
that it did not have any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

The preceding road does not establish the fact of

tightness, elevation, or visual impairments of the relevant
curve.
Furthermore, the admitted video tape was misleading
in that it was filmed at a different height, speed, and from
a different position in the road than that which the parties
actually experienced. These variations instilled in the minds
of the jury a strong, distorted, and misleading impression of
6

what the parties actually viewed. As a matter of law, courts
have excluded demonstrative evidence which is distorted and
misleading.
For example, photographic evidence which is taken of
a

location other than the relevant

scene, and used as

illustrative of the actual scene, must be substantially
similar to the actual location.

In the case at bar the

evidence of the preceding road, admitted on the grounds that
it was indicative of the type of curve experienced by the
parties, is not similar to the actual s-curve, and no attempt
by the court was made to determine if it was substantially
similar

to

warrant

the

admission

of

such

evidence.

The second error made involves the trial court
allowing defense counsel to circumvent the well established
collateral source rule by pursuing a line of questioning which
revealed

the

plaintiff's

already

workers1

recovered

compensation benefits from the relevant accident.
It is apparent from the information which defense
counsel possessed concerning workers1 compensation benefits
that

this

line

of

questioning

would

revealing already received benefits.

elicit

a

response

Also, defense counsel

and the court were warned that this questioning would, and in
fact did, elicit the injection of damaging evidence concerning
7

workers1 compensation benefits. Such evidence instills in the
jury's minds that the injured party has already received
benefits and may be undeserving of further compensation.
Finally, the trial
evidence

of

inseparably
There

are

an

admission

court

of

erred

liability

in disallowing
because

it

was

linked with evidence of liability insurance.
numerous

exceptions

to

the

rule

prohibiting

admission of liability insurance that are established both
statutorily and judicially.

One such exception is that

evidence as to liability insurance is admissible when such
evidence is inseparably intertwined with an admission of
liability.

Such admissions of

liability have not been

restricted to oral admissions, but may included conduct which
clearly indicates such an admission.
The defendant's conduct consists of a quick change
of liability insurance in mid policy period just after the
accident, an unfounded explanation for such a prompt switch,
and an attempt to misinform as to the actual time in which the
switch was made.

These facts, examined closely, are an

admission of liability and should not have been excluded.
Disallowing the admission of such evidence hindered the
plaintiff in proving his theory of the case.
For the above-mentioned reasons the plaintiff was
8

prejudiced and the trial court should grant a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
WHICH IS IRRELEVANT AND MISLEADING.
Utah Rules of Evidence state that "Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." The courts admission of the
Duval video tape depicting the road prior to the section of
road where the accident occurred is irrelevant and should have
been so excluded.
amended).

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence (1974, as

In addition to the irrelevancy of this section of

video tape, any possible probative value was outweighed by the
prejudicially misleading effect it had on the jury. Rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence

(1991).

"Relevant evidence means

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."

Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence

(1971, as

amended).
The central fact in dispute in this case is whether
the defendant did or did not cross the center line which in
turn caused the plaintiff to swerve off the road and collide
into some rock outcroppings.
The evidence which was admitted at trial was a video
9

tape of the road before the segment where the accident
actually occurred, as seen from the inside of a car, at a
different speed than was actually travelled by the parties,
and of segments of the road that were not involved in the
accident.

It is clear that the section of road before the

accident scene does not establish the fact of tightness,
elevation, or visual

impairments of the relevant curve.

Hypothetically, a road could be flat for miles and then at a
specific section steeply climb, or straight and then suddenly
curve to the right or left. The "general characteristics" of
the preceding road does not have any "tendency to make the
existence

of

any

fact

that

is

of

consequence

to

the

determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."
The defendants originally sought admission of the
above mentioned video, as well as another similar video, to
support their theory that the plaintiff misperceived the
defendant coming over the center line, because of a claimed
optical illusion.

Defendant's expert testified as to this

optical illusion theory created by the bend in the road at the
segment where the accident occurred.

However, the jury was

shown a video tape which was: filmed

from

a different

elevation than that seen by the plaintiff on his motorcycle;
10

from a different position in the road; at a different speed
than that traveled by the parties; and not the segment of the
road where this proposed optical illusion occurred. The jury,
in the present case, was asked to determine whether the
defendant crossed the center line and was therefore negligent.
Showing the jury the section of the road that was not involved
in the accident misled the jury by creating, in their minds,
a strongly emphasized and inaccurate picture of what the road
looked like to the plaintiff, than that which the plaintiff
actually perceived.
The

above

mentioned

variations

such

as

the

difference in elevation that the video was filmed from and
different sections of road than actually confronted by the
parties at the time of the accident, created a perception
completely different than that confronted by the parties. In
Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256, 267, 11 So. 611, 613 (1892), an
early case that dealt with photographs taken from a distorted
angle, such evidence was excluded.

The court reasoned that

this distorted evidence "could have been of no assistance to
the jury in the case, but would have served as an agency of
confusion."

This same confusion occurred in the case at bar

when such evidence was admitted; the segments did not aid the
trier of fact, but rather confused the jury as to what the
11

parties

actually

viewed

when

the

accident

occurred.

Defendant's own expert testified that an increase of as little
as one foot in elevation can eguate to a ten foot difference
in perception.

(Please Abstract from Transcript of Trial:

Hearing held on February 13, page 48, line 20-25)
Furthermore, these segments of the Duval video were
admitted to show the same type of curve that was involved in
the accident. The court allowed this misleading evidence "as
illustrative of the roadway, the type of a road, generally the
type of a curve." (Ibid at page 41, line 6-12)

However, it

has been determined in other sister states that photographic
evidence which is taken of a location other than the relevant
scene, and used

as illustrative

of that

scene must be

substantially similar to the actual location.

In Johnson v.

State, 636 P.2d 47, 68 (Alaska 1981), the court reasoned that
dissimilar

photographic

prejudicial,

and

failure

evidence
to

is

excluded

misleading,
such

evidence

and
is

reversible error.
In the case at bar there was no effort by the trial
court or defense counsel to determine whether the curves
depicted in the segments of video are substantially similar to
the s-curve where the accident occurred.

Also, in closing

arguments the defendant stressed his theory that as the
12

plaintiff approached t f:<
"IIIG

curve where the accident occurred

,, M.» towd t di I he n\ idci 1 (• of thf rocj<l,"

teridf'iiC'y would LM

and he therefore could not see approaching traffic and d i d i lot
have time

defendant crossing over the center I1ne
* . ,• t

defendant alludec
changes

•

11 i emphasiz ing

t::l: i i s

theor y ,r the

•:< video-taped curves I n the road and
See Defendant 1

levation.

page

Closing Arguments,

mis misled the jury as to w hat the

parties actually saw, served to prejudice the plaintiff by
groundlessly supporting the defendant's theor y and di reef Iy
contradicted the plaintiff f s own testimony, which was crucial
to the plaintiff * s case,,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
PURPOSELY SOLICIT THE INJECTION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF

IN QUESTION.
is wel
ijue.st i on,1

-cceptec

cei'Tii -•*

-

be admitted into trial.

:• *
i

t

"We

should in i)t be injected into thp
P.2d

121,

123

(Utah

\^\

.%

.-,.

v **

generally
should

:

iepart from *M, * )r>er

position: that the question 01

409

-.1**

nsurance
+

1965).
13

--',>.

* " Robinson v. Hreinson,
Those

courts who

have

addressed this issue have focused their attention on the
detrimental effect knowledge of the defendant having liability
insurance has on the decision of a jury.

It is proposed that

the jury's inclination is to base their decision as to
liability upon their sympathy for the plaintiff without any
restraint as to the financial burden upon the defendant.
This same concern is equally applicable to the
plaintiff when knowledge of injuries suffered by the plaintiff
are in fact covered by insurance, or in the case at bar by
workers'

compensation,

benefits are admitted.

and

evidence

of

already

received

Such knowledge eviscerates in the

juror's minds the need to compensate the injured party. Also,
the introduction of such a collateral source instills in the
mind of the jury the further prejudicial
plaintiff

will

be

Allowing

opposing

doubly
counsel

compensated
to

idea that the

for his

introduce

such

injuries.
evidence

prejudices the plaintiff both as to liability and as to
damages•
This

is

a

case

of

first

impression

in

this

jurisdiction, however, some sister states have thoroughly
examined whether the introduction of evidence by the defendant
about the plaintiff receiving workers' compensation benefits
is prejudicial, immaterial and reversible.
14

T h e M o n t a n a Supreme Court h e l d t h a t a d m i s s i o n of
pvideucf i'om.'orn i nq wui Vvi s 1 coropi'iis«t t ion was rcvers lb I e. ei: it: TII:
and w a r r a n t e d a n e w trial
T h i s cour t h a s specifically d e t e r m i n e d t h a t in a
p e r s o n a l injury action t h e p r e j u d i c i a l impact o f
allowing a jury to receive evidence of plaintiff's
pending
workers'
compensation
claim
vastly
outweighs the probative value of such evidence.
Allers v. Willis, 643 P.2d 592, 39 St. Rep. 745
(Mont. 1982)
The court ruled in Allers that
evidence of the workersf compensation claim was
clearly inadmissable, quota rig the fol ] owi ng passage
from an annotation:
General ly# i t has been held to constitute
error, requiring a reversal or new trial,
to bring to the jury's attention the fact
that the plaintiff in a personal injury
or death action is entitled to workmen's
compensation benefits. The courts have
reasoned that such information would tend
to prejudice the jury and influence their
verdict, either as to liability or
damages,
as
such
information
is
ordinarily immaterial and,, irrelevant, 77
A.L.R. 2d at 1156.
Admission of this evidence [evidence of receiv ed
workers' compensation benefits] was reversible
error and requires a new trial.
Mvdlarz v. Palmer/Duncan Const. Co.. 682 P.2d 695, 703 (Mont.
1984).
These are other jurisdictions which have addressed
this issue and found similarly:
Jarrel v. Woodland Mfg. Co. , / o h m A pp,

t ci .,' 0 , *n b

N.E. 2d ] 015 (1982): The court determined that the trial court
erred

in ^

*

.

receipt of workers' compensation benefits for h i s injuries,
15

even for the limited purpose of proving that the plaintiff had
diminished incentive to work.

This evidence was elicited

during cross-examination, and a new trial was granted.
Duffek v. Vanderhei. 81 111. App. 3d 1078, 401 N.E.
2d 1145 (1980): The court reaffirmed the states longstanding
principle that "It is well established that evidence that a
plaintiff filed a workmen's compensation claim or received
benefits is highly prejudicial and may not be introduced in a
jury trial."
Bibbv v. Hilstrom, 260 Or. 267, 490 P.2d 161 (1971):
The court held that it was reversible error to allow the
injection of evidence as to recovered workers' compensation
benefits both in pleadings and during trial. The court also
cited Strandholm v. General Const. Co., 235 Or. 145, 382 P.2d
843 (1963), where the court held that intentional injection of
evidence as to workers' compensation was prejudicial and
reversible error.
In the instant case, while cross-examining the
plaintiff, the defendant's counsel clearly sought to inject
evidence about workers' compensation coverage subsequent, but
related to the accident in question.

(Please see Abstract

From Transcript of Trial: Comprising the Cross Examination of
Douglas E. Butts, page 15, line 10-25 and page 16, line 1-7)
16

Defense counsel asked whether the plaintiff worked for Ray
h u t t Si i i iri'il r u c L i LJII

i n I,pht,,?^rl-

"f

l m

) 0 l i s a n i'inp I u y t •

i(

wl lei i

defense counsel knew that

plaintiff had testified under

oath

i

.

deposition that he

in not ,uiy nthn employer
accident

occurred;

workinc

with

. :r.<
±xne J.-C ,
on

u*

1ino

personal

wood-

> -..*& ueen unemployed

(See Plaint. - :

- « through page 48. line

D^LLS

- • *-- •:;.--•/- mpnt i nned

the except ioi

defendant testified that
accident.

Ra^

employed

Deposition 1, page

; Deposition 2, paqe

»

ft

I •• li ; | M i f P

Pa<?e 22, line •
The plaintiff answered that he cii d not work for Ray

lis Constr i icti oi i

Defei ise coui ise] thei i asked tit le p] a i i it i ff

v he had filed a workers 1 compensation claim during February,
1990,

knowing that he hat! f i J ed thin claim ai id that it was

I i J ed i i! ""innrti'ct n HI with t lie 1**8/ an • i dent . ( See Appendix A)

Notwithstanding defense counsel f s knowledge of the
I'Jatnt""' ' -

'.- i' ' •

counsel
counsel was i u n y

apparent

unemployed

status,

luestioning was further disingenuous in that
aware of I In*1 ox I <*n1 nl U " " • ••» • rut i 1 i * s

injuries and physical disability, and knew that
made

defense

condition

it impossible, at the time the claim was filed, to
17

continue as an employee of Ray Butts Construction.

(See

Plaintiff's Deposition 2, page 7, line 1-8; page 35, line 19
through page 36, line 2; page 37, line 22-35; Deposition 3,
page 5, line 3-5; page 6, line 15-23; page 11, line* 7-12; page
20, line 12-19)
Plaintiff's

counsel,

seeing

the

direction

and

possible prejudice that could result if informcition as to
already recovered workers' compensation benefits were to reach
the jury, sought to preclude such evidence from being admitted
by objecting and requesting a side bar conference as to
defense counsel's line of questioning.

(Please see Abstract

From Transcript of Trial: Comprising the Cross Examination of
Douglas

E.

Butts, page

15,

line

10-25;

Abstract

From

Transcript of Trial: comprising proceedings had outside the
presence of the jury, page 9, line 17-22)
Defense counsel was warned by plaintiff's counsel,
at side bar, that this line of questioning would inevitably
elicit evidence connecting the workers' compensation claim,
which

defense

counsel

introduced,

received with the 1987 accident.

and

benefits

already

The judge allowed defense

counsel to continue. Having answered that he was not employed
with

Ray

Butts

Construction

during

February,

1990, the

plaintiff was faced with the ambiguous perception created by
18

defense counse '
-4t' 'in e m p l o y e *

question -

;

whether lie had I iled a claim

l tin if. , , ,„ ,

,,a1 I H M

I b a n «-) 1 I iiu

liiiniselt

. be perceived as dishonest, the plaintiff w a s compelled to
answer

that

he

had

filed
h J .%

residual

effect

nt

such

1 i UK»

the
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questioning, defense counsel purposely sought
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evidence suggesting or implying
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that the defendant is protected by liability
insurance, the suggestion of the possession of
insurance will not be avoided at the cost of
suppressing evidence material to the establishment
of a cause of action and the liability of a
defendant sued for damages, or to show bias or
prejudice of a witness.
Annot., Admissability of evidence, and propriety and effect of
questions, comments, etc. tending to show that defendant in
personal injury or death action carries liability insurance,
4 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949)(Emphasis added).
In addition to Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1991), which provides for exceptions to the above mentioned
rule, the courts in this jurisdiction have addressed and
accepted one other exception.

Testimony showing that a

defendant is covered by liability insurance is admissible when
a reference to insurance is a part of an admission of
liability or responsibility.

Reid v. Owens, 93 P.2d 680

(1939); Gittens v. Lundbera, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955).
The
possible
existence

above

prejudicial
of

mentioned
impact

liability

courts
of

reasoned

evidence

insurance was

that

the

indicating

the

outweighed

by

the

probative value of the evidence indicating admitted liability;
the two of which were inseparably intertwined.
In the case at bar, the defendant changed automobile
insurance from one company to another three weeks after the
20

relevar

I* • •

ccident.

ilrl f'liiJ *

fJH

e p l a i n t i f f f H theory

•

imminer

repercussions

: '.

b e i n g a t fault w o u l d lea
: >f 1: :i i s a 1 i: e a d y

h I ifh

the

w a s :i n

defendant

that t h e

-hi'o; r o m p ^ n II?',J 1 ^ p r e - e n t
n e g l i g e n c e ; namely,

f he

that h i s

h i g h e r p r e m i u m s or c a n c e l l a t i o n

•

'

*s eliaiitje

mid-pol : \

Wdi; maih,

win j I c?

(See Abstract

From

Transcript of Trial

omprising testimony and arguments on

motions held outsid

presence of the jury, February 1 4,

1991, page 2, 1 i ne

:

Ii :i:i ti a] 1

oage 3, 1 i ne 1 )
Pendant

::ieri:ii eci

switched policies after t h e accident, and
Ads

I M V i m)

maintained that

several m o n t h s b e f o r e h e m a d e t h e c h a n g e .
i

i|u n elk I y

(Ibid at

However , \ ipoi I c:i: oss • exami nat:i oi I t:l le

d e f e n d a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t i t w a s three weeks rather than three
months,

and he also

conceded

that

he and

discussed thi s change during this short: time.

wife had
. 1. at naae

5, line 10-1 5)
Plaintiff's theory is further supported by evidence
wh :i c l I

d isproves

t h e defendant

a 1 leged

switching insurance policies

;

motivation for

hasty manner.

defendant c la i med (hat he sw i ;. ,.,..*...,, „i ud,i<
of

lower

premiums.

Wh :i 1 e testimony

did prove

-

The
,.-...

that the

defendant's policy with Allstate, the initial policy, w a s
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higher than the State Farm policy, it was revealed that the
defendant was insured under a higher risk policy through
Allstate Indemnity, an affiliate of Allstate which deals
exclusively with high risk policies.

(Ibid, at page 17, line

2-6)
The evidence indicates that the defendant, had he
given

his present

insurer

correct

information

regarding

previous accidents, would not have been given a lower rate
than he already possessed.
reevaluated

by

Allstate

Also, if his driving record was
as being

clear

of

any

further

accidents or moving violations, Allstate would have* reassigned
him to the lower risk company and his rates would then be less
than the present
acquired.

State Farm policy which the defendant

(Ibid, at page 18-28)

This conduct, although not

verbally expressed, is an admission of liability, and is so
intertwined with evidence of liability insurance that it
appropriately fits within the exception set forth in Reid v.
Owens, 93 P.2d

680

(1939).

Excluding this admission of

liability clearly prejudices the plaintiff, and restricts him
from presenting evidence as to the defendant's liability and
warrants a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff was prejudiced both as to liability
22

and

damages

counsel
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would ic^uiL
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admission

,

irrelevart

id

questioning which counsel knew
injection of prejudicial

concern,] ng already recea

information

" workers ' compensati on bene:!: i ts,

and by I" ho court excluding crucial evidence regarding an
admission of 1 tabu lity by the defendant

For the

above reasons, several 1 y or cumulatively,, the defendant was
prejudiced and a n«w +-ri al should be granted.
DATED AND - '3NED 1
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•

J E F F ^ Y C.~PEATROSS
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys
for
PI a i nt: i t f /
Appellant
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Brief of Appellant, upon Nelson Hayes and George T. Naegle of
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ADDENDUM
D i m : 1 ™ 1 MA'-"T"i.' RULES

A.

'i

Rules

of

Evidence,

of

Evidence,

Rule

4 01

(1971,

as

402

(1974

as

.... - -,-,(3)

R,

..

Rules

Rule

amen.^d)

C,

": ••'

D.

uLan rvuies of Evidence, Rule 411 (1991)

es of Evidence, Rule 403 (1991)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (1953, as amended)
APPENDIX A
1

NOTICE

.• APPEAL
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the addon more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Advisory Committee Note* — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact" Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court.
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of remoteness.
Cited.
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P*2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. SkaggB Companies, Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Cited in State v. Gray, 717 ?M 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 PJ2& 123 (Utah
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct App. 1988); fisher ex rel.
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct App.
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317
(Utah Ct App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct App. 1989); Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific

Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L. Rev. 839.

1

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi- adds the words "or the (Constitution of the state
dence (1974) except that prior to the word of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi"statute" the words "Constitution of the United dence (1974).
States" have been added.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instance* would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect, Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 PSld 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2(l 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the conrect reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

Rule 411. Liability insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership,
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is inson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d
the federal rule, verbatim. The provisions of 121 (1965); Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50,93 P.2d
this rule are comparable to Rule 54, Utah 680 (1939).
Rules of Evidence (1971) and case law. Cf. Rob-

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court —
Appeals [Effective until January 1, 19881.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil amd criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges have power to issue all extraordinary writs and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the JudLcl^j
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of
the district court in multiple judge districts, or the district court judge in
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upontne
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced
in the circuit court and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court
of Appeals.
,. .
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district
court are under §§ 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f)fiTifllorders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by tbe Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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NELSON L. HAYES (A1433)
GEORGE T. NAEGLE (A5001)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS E. BUTTS,
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY LANEY,

Civil No. CV-87-1954
Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendant.

This matter, having come on regularly before the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, and the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen having found that this matter was tried to a jury
between the dates of February 11, 1991 and February 14, 1991,
and the plaintiff having been represented by R. Phil Ivie and
Jeffery Peatross, and the defendant having been represented by
Nelson L. Hayes and George T. Naegle and that the jury returned
a special verdict answering questions 3 and 4 as follows:

3.

At the time and place of the incident in

question and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence,
was Gary Laney negligent?
Yes

No
4.

X

Was such negligence a proximate cause of the

plaintiff's injuries?
Yes

No

X

The Court, having reviewed the special verdict form
and for good cause showing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the plaintiff Douglas E. Butts1 cause of

action against the defendant Gary Laney be dismissed with
prejudice and upon the merits and that a verdict of no cause of
action be entered against the plaintiff Douglas E. Butts.
2.

That the defendant Gary Laney, be awarded

costs in the amount of $
DATED this £_

__.
day of

>7/^£/C

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

THE HON. X2ULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN
DISTRICT ^X>URT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed-by first class, postage
prepaid, this Jiff
day of
Af/7'.
1991 to the following:
R. Phil Ivie
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

FILED.
4TH OIS;

3 53 Pft 'SI
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
IVIE & YOUNG
48 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE
P. 0. BOX 672
PROVO, UTAH 84603
375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS E. BUTTS,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs,
GARY LANEY and EAGLE SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL, and EAGLE
MARKETING CORPORATION,
Defendants and
Appellees.

Civil No.

CV-87-1954

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

COMES NOW the plaintiff and appellant, Douglas E.
Butts, by and through his attorney R. Phil Ivie, and appeals
to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment rendered in the
above-entitled matter on the 5th day of March, 1991.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED AND SIGNED this ^/

'day

R. PHILyTVlP*
IVIE j/YOUNG

Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, with postage prepaid
thereon, this <^£_~day of April, 1991, to the following:

Nelson L. Hayes
Richards, Brandt, Miller
& Nelson
50 South Main #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

Robert Henderson
Snow, Chirstensen
& Martineau
10 Exchange Place
Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
SaJrt Lake City, UT

K-mfiM

V/\MtfTV\

NANCY J./MONSON

SecretaQr)'

84145

